Showing posts with label ECJ ruling. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ECJ ruling. Show all posts

Thursday, July 28, 2011

No surprise as pharma repackaging rulings rush through

The labels on the box never troubled the IPKat,
but the contents sometimes caused surprise ...
Not every case which is bound for the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling takes forever.  The two cases noted here, Joined Cases C‑400/09 and C‑207/10, Orifarm v Merck Sharpe & Dohme; Paranova v Merck Sharp & Dohme, sped through in pretty good time.  One was referred in October 2009, attracting a ruling in substantially less than two years, while the other hurtled past the judges' noses at almost the speed of light, having been referred as recently as April 2010.  Speedy cases aren't usually the sign of an efficient court, though: they're an indication that the questions referred for a reference were too easy to spend a lot of time on -- as is the case here.

In Case C‑400/09 pharma giant Merck made trade mark-protected medicinal products which Orifarm imported in parallel on to the Danish market by the Orifarm group. Orifarm and another company, Handelsselskabet, held the authorisations to market and sell those medicinal products, while Orifarm Supply and Ompakningsselskabet, which carried out the repackaging, held authorisations to do so. All decisions concerning the purchase, repackaging and sale of these products, including decisions relating to the design of the new packagings and their labelling, were taken by Orifarm or Handelsselskabet. Ompakningsselskabet and Orifarm Supply bought and repackaged the medicinal products, assuming liability for compliance with the requirements for repackagers laid down by the Danish Medicinal Products Agency. The packaging of the products indicated that they had been repackaged by Orifarm or Handelsselskabet, as the case may be.

Merck sued Orifarm, Handelsselskabet and Ompakningsselskabet, on the ground that the name of the actual repackager did not appear on the packaging of the products. The trial court agreed that the defendants had infringed Merck’s trade mark rights by failing to indicate on the packaging the name of the undertaking which had actually performed the repackaging, ordering them to pay damages. The defendants appealed to the Danish Supreme Court, which decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) The Court of Justice is requested to clarify whether [Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others and MPA Pharma --earlier ECJ decisions] are to be interpreted as meaning that a parallel importer which is the holder of the marketing authorisation for, and possesses information on, a medicinal product imported in parallel, and which issues instructions to a separate undertaking for the purchase and repackaging of a medicinal product, for the detailed design of the product’s packaging and for arrangements in relation to the product, infringes the rights of the trade mark proprietor by indicating itself – and not the separate undertaking which holds the repackaging authorisation, has imported the product and has carried out the physical repackaging, including (re)affixing of the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark – as the repackager on the outer packaging of the medicinal product imported in parallel. 
(2) The Court of Justice is requested to clarify whether it is of significance in answering Question 1 that an assumption might be made that, where the marketing authorisation holder indicates itself as the repackager instead of the undertaking which physically carried out the repackaging to order, there is no risk that the consumer/end user might be misled into assuming that the trade mark proprietor is responsible for the repackaging. 
(3) The Court of Justice is requested to clarify whether it is of significance in answering Question 1 that an assumption might be made that the risk of misleading the consumer/end user into assuming that the trade mark proprietor is responsible for the repackaging is excluded if the undertaking which physically carried out the repackaging is indicated as being the repackager. 
(4) The Court of Justice is requested to clarify whether it is only the risk that the consumer/end user might be misled into assuming that the trade mark proprietor is responsible for the repackaging which is of significance in answering Question 1, or whether other considerations regarding the trade mark proprietor are also relevant, for example 
(a) that the entity which undertakes the importation and physical repackaging and (re)affixes the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark on the product’s outer packaging potentially on its own account infringes the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark by so doing, and 
(b) that it may be due to factors for which the entity that physically carried out the repackaging is responsible that the repackaging affects the original condition of the product or that the presentation of the repackaging is of such a kind that it must be assumed to harm the trade mark proprietor’s reputation (see, inter alia, … Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others …). 
(5) The Court of Justice is requested to clarify whether it is of significance in answering Question 1 that the holder of the marketing authorisation, which has indicated itself as being the repackager, at the time of the notification of the trade mark proprietor prior to the intended sale of the parallel imported medicinal product once repackaged, belongs to the same group as the actual repackager (sister company).’
In Case C‑207/10 much the same thing happened, but the same court referred slightly different questions:
‘(1) Are Article 7(2) of [Directive 89/104] and the associated case-law, in particular the judgments of the Court of Justice in … Hoffmann-La Roche … and … Pfizer … and … Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others … to be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark proprietor may rely on these provisions in order to prevent a parallel importer’s marketing company, which is the holder of a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product in a Member State, from selling that product with an indication that the product is repackaged by the marketing company, although the marketing company has the physical repackaging carried out by another company, the repackaging company, to which the marketing company gives instructions for the purchasing and repackaging of the product, for the detailed design of the product’s packaging and for other arrangements in relation to the product, and which holds the repackaging authorisation and reaffixes the trade mark on the new package in the course of repackaging? 
(2) Is it of significance in answering Question 1 that an assumption might be made that the consumer or end-user is not misled with regard to the origin of the product and will not be led to believe that the trade mark proprietor is responsible for the repackaging through the indication by the parallel importer of the manufacturer’s name on the packaging along with the indication as described of the undertaking responsible for the repackaging? 
(3) Is it only the risk that the consumer or end-user might be misled into assuming that the trade mark proprietor is responsible for the repackaging which is of significance in answering Question 1, or are other considerations regarding the trade mark proprietor also relevant, for example 
(a) that the entity which in fact undertakes the purchasing and repackaging and reaffixes the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark on the product’s packaging thereby potentially infringes independently the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark rights, and that that may be due to factors for which the entity that physically carried out the repackaging is responsible, 
(b) that the repackaging affects the original condition of the product, or 
(c) that the presentation of the repackaged product is of such a kind that it may be assumed to harm the trade mark or its proprietor’s reputation? 
(4) If, in answering Question 3, the Court finds that it is also relevant to take account of the fact that the repackaging company potentially infringes independently the trade mark rights of the trade mark proprietor, the Court is asked to indicate whether it is of significance to this answer that the marketing company and repackaging company of the parallel importer are jointly and severally liable under national law for the infringement of the trade mark proprietor’s trade mark rights. 
(5) Is it of significance in answering Question 1 that the parallel importer which holds the marketing authorisation and has indicated itself as being responsible for repackaging, at the time of the notification of the trade mark proprietor prior to the intended sale of the repackaged medicinal product, belongs to the same group as the company which undertook the repackaging (sister company)? 
(6) Is it of significance in answering Question 1 that the repackaging company is indicated as the manufacturer in the package leaflet?’
What with all these questions, some readers might have been expecting a lengthy set of answers -- but not this Kat. He knew they'd be short and sweet:
"Article 7(2) of First Council Directive 89/104 ... must be interpreted as not allowing the proprietor of a trade mark relating to a pharmaceutical product which is the subject of parallel imports to oppose the further marketing of that product in repackaged form on the sole ground that the new packaging indicates as the repackager not the undertaking which, on instructions, actually repackaged the product and holds an authorisation to do so, but the undertaking which holds the marketing authorisation for the product, on whose instructions the repackaging was carried out, and which assumes liability for the repackaging".
In other words, never mind the technicalities as to whose name appears on the packaging -- look at the reality. The trade mark owner's interest in preserving the integrity of its trade marks is unaffected and the consumer is not threatened or misled,  End of story.

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Fair compensation for private copying: ECJ says someone has to pay ...

Even if you feel you're being fleeced by having
to pay for private copying, they'll get you in the end ...
Today's the day the Court of Justice of the European Union gave judgment in Case C-462/09 Stichting de Thuiskopie v Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, Mijndert van der Lee and Hananja van der Lee, a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (the Dutch Supreme Court).

What was the cause of this reference? As the Court explained, Article 16c(1) of the Dutch copyright law made an exception in its national law in favour of copying for private use. However, Article 16(2) adds that a maker or importer of an item used for reproduction [once upon a time this used to be mainly tape recording equipment and photocopiers, but the recent wave of convergence will soon have us taking photos with our toothbrushes ...] has to pay a private copying levy. Stichting de Thuiskopie is the Dutch body responsible for recovering the private copying levy, while Opus -- a German company -- sells blank media online via Dutch-language websites that target Netherlands consumers. Opus's business model was bound to annoy copyright owners:
" The contract of sale established by Opus provides that, where a Netherlands consumer makes an order online, that order is processed in Germany and the goods are delivered from Germany to the Netherlands, on behalf of and in the name of the customer, by a carrier, that carrier however in fact being engaged by Opus. 
Opus does not pay a private copying levy in respect of the media delivered to its customers in the Netherlands, either in that Member State or in Germany.  ...[T]he cost of the reproduction media thus sold by Opus does not include the private copying levy".
Arguing that Opus had to be regarded as the ‘importer’ and, consequently, responsible for paying the private copying levy, the Stichting sued for payment of that levy. Opus denied liability, saying it couldn't be classified as an importer into the Netherlands of the reproduction media which it sold and that it was individual Dutch consumers who must be classified as importers. The trial court and first appellate court agreed with Opus, following which the Stichting appealed to the Hoge Raad. What an interesting dispute, said the Hoge Raaders and decided to pose the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Does [the InfoSoc] Directive [2001/29], in particular Article 5(2)(b) and (5) thereof [which allow EU Member States to make exceptions to copyright in exchange for "fair compensation"], provide any assistance in determining who should be regarded under national law as owing the “fair compensation” referred to in Article 5(2)(b)? If so, what assistance does it provide? 
(2) In a case of distance selling in which the buyer is established in a different Member State to that of the seller, does Article 5(5) of Directive [2001/29] require national law to be interpreted so broadly that a person owing the “fair compensation” referred to in Article 5(2)(b) of the directive who is acting on a commercial basis owes such compensation in at least one of the Member States involved in the distance selling?’
The Court ruled today as follows:
"1. Directive 2001/29 ..., in particular Article 5(2)(b) and (5) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the final user who carries out, on a private basis, the reproduction of a protected work must, in principle, be regarded as the person responsible for paying the fair compensation provided for in Article 5(2)(b) [i.e. not Opus but its customers]. 
However, it is open to the Member States to establish a private copying levy chargeable to the persons who make reproduction equipment, devices and media available to that final user [so the Dutch can make Opus pay ...], since they are able to pass on the amount of that levy in the price paid by the final user for that service [... and Opus can then charge more]. 
2. Directive 2001/29, in particular Article 5(2)(b) and (5) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the Member State which has introduced a system of private copying levies chargeable to the manufacturer or importer of media for reproduction of protected works, and on the territory of which the harm caused to authors by the use for private purposes of their work by purchasers who reside there occurs, to ensure that those authors actually receive the fair compensation intended to compensate them for that harm [this can be more or less inferred from the text of the Directive, but it would have been easier and clearer if the Directive had simply said "Member States must ensure that any fair compensation is received by the author ..." or some such formula]. In that regard, the mere fact that the commercial seller of reproduction equipment, devices and media is established in a Member State other than that in which the purchasers reside has no bearing on that obligation [i.e. the obligation of the Member State to ensure that authors get paid] to achieve a certain result. It is for the national court, where it is impossible to ensure recovery of the fair compensation from the purchasers, to interpret national law in order to allow recovery of that compensation from the person responsible for payment who is acting on a commercial basis."
The IPKat wonders if the duty of the Member State to ensure that authors receive their entitlement is one of those things that is relatively easy to impose in principle but less easy to implement in practice. Where media for the reproduction of protected works enter a country by post in an innocuous little padded envelope, sent from a vendor based in inconveniently distant EU Member State where things are, well, a little more informal than they are in the Netherlands, the identification of both vendor and purchaser and the quantification of the number of levy-payable transactions may prove difficult.

What the world says: 
"Thuiskopieheffing ook op blanco cd's uit buitenland" here
"Los estados deben garantizar siempre el cobro del canon en su territorio" here
"Diritto d'autore: per la Corte di Giustizia, i Paesi Ue che prevedono l’eccezione per copia privata devono garantire l’equo compenso: La sentenza stabilisce che bisogna riscuoterlo anche se il venditore si trova in un altro Stato membro" here
"Sheep on house roof in Pontycymmer escapes unhurt" here

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

WEB SHIPPING ruling: CTM injunctions both are and aren't pan-European

This morning the Court of Justice gave its ruling in Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS (formerly DHL International SA) v Chronopost SA, a case which the IPKat suspects will be greatly discussed, analysed, applied and indeed misapplied in years to come.

Web shipping, or clipper art?
The facts were quite straightforward. Chronopost owned both French and Community trade marks for the sign WEBSHIPPING, for, inter alia, "services relating to: logistics and data transmission; telecommunications; transport by road; collecting mail, newspaper and parcels; and express mail management". DHL, a competitor, had used the signs WEB SHIPPING, Web Shipping and/or Webshipping to designate its own online-accessible express mail management service. Chronopost sued DHL for trade mark infringement before the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, a Community trade mark court. The court held DHL liable for infringing Chronopost's French mark, but did not adjudicate on infringement of the Community trade mark. Following an appeal, the Cour d’appel de Paris prohibited DHL from continuing to use Chronopost's French and Community trade marks, also ordering a periodic penalty payment if the injunction were breached.

DHL's appeal to the Cour de cassation was dismissed, but that court heard the cross-appeal of Chronopost in which it submitted that the Cour d’appel judgment was contrary to Articles 1 and 98 of Community Trade Mark Regulation 40/94 (CTMR) in so far as the prohibition against further infringement of the Community trade mark WEBSHIPPING, subject to a periodic penalty payment, did not explicitly extend to the entire area of the European Union.  According to the Cour de cassation, since the judgment did not contain any operative words expressly relating to the application to extend the prohibition issued by that court to the entire area of the European Union, it must be construed as applying only to French territory. However, since it had doubts as to its interpretation of Article 98 of the CTMR, the Cour de cassation decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions for a preliminary ruling:

"1. Must Article 98 ... be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition issued by a Community trade mark court has effect as a matter of law throughout the entire area of the [European Union]?

2. If not, is that court entitled to apply specifically that prohibition to the territories of other States in which the acts of infringement are committed or threatened?

3. In either case, are the coercive measures which the court, by application of its national law, has attached to the prohibition issued by it applicable within the territories of the Member States in which that prohibition would have effect?

4. In the contrary case, may that court order such a coercive measure, similar to or different from that which it adopts pursuant to its national law, by application of the national laws of the States in which that prohibition would have effect?"
In answer to these questions, the Court ruled thus:

"1. Article 98(1) ... must be interpreted as meaning that the scope of the prohibition against further infringement or threatened infringement of a Community trade mark, issued by a Community trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Articles 93(1) to (4) and 94(1) of that regulation, extends, as a rule, to the entire area of the European Union. [see comment below]

2. Article 98(1), second sentence, ...  must be interpreted as meaning that a coercive measure, such as a periodic penalty payment, ordered by a Community trade mark court by application of its national law, in order to ensure compliance with a prohibition against further infringement or threatened infringement which it has issued, has effect in Member States to which the territorial scope of such a prohibition extends other than the Member State of that court, under the conditions laid down, in Chapter III of Council Regulation ... 44/2001 ... on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, with regard to the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Where the national law of one of those other Member States does not contain a coercive measure similar to that ordered by the Community trade mark court, the objective pursued by that measure must be attained by the competent court of that other Member State by having recourse to the relevant provisions of its national law which are such as to ensure that the prohibition is complied with in an equivalent manner". [This should be fun in terms of compliance. EU Regulations are directly applicable in national law, but courts may not find that their national law lets them make up equivalent relief all by themselves.  Article 11 of the IP Enforcement Directive makes recurrent payments optional, but the effect of this ruling is to make them compulsory in these circumstances even if they are not available to local litigants]
Essentially, what the court said was that, since the jurisdiction of Community trade mark courts is pan-European and the scope of Community trade marks is pan-European, in principle an order made by a Community trade mark court in respect of a Community trade mark is pan-European too -- even though infringement of a Community trade mark is governed in each country's Community trade mark court by the national law relating to infringement of a national trade mark.  There are two exceptions to this. One is where the plaintiff only asks for partial relief.  Also, in paras 46 to 48:
"... The exclusive right of a Community trade mark proprietor, as provided for under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 40/94, is conferred in order to enable that proprietor to protect his specific interests as such, that is, to ensure that the trade mark is able to fulfil its functions. The exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C‑238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited)
It follows ... that the exclusive right of a Community trade mark proprietor and, hence, the territorial scope of that right, may not extend beyond what that right allows its proprietor to do in order to protect his trade mark, that is, to prohibit only uses which are liable to affect the functions of the trade mark. The acts or future acts of a defendant (namely the person whose use of the Community trade mark is complained of) which do not affect the functions of the Community trade mark, cannot therefore be prohibited".
Accordingly, if a Community trade mark court ... finds that the acts of infringement or threatened infringement of a Community trade mark are limited to a single Member State or to part of the territory of the European Union ... because the defendant proves that the use of the sign at issue does not affect or is not liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, for example on linguistic grounds, that court must limit the territorial scope of the prohibition which it issues. [Does this mean that where, on account of phonetic and conceptual similarity that exists in some EU states but not others, an injunction to prohibit use of a mark similar to a CTM cannot be prohibited in countries in which no likelihood of confusion exists, since that cannot affect the functions of the CTM?  Or does it mean that functions other than the "essential function" of indicating identity of origin have to be invoked in order to retain the pan-EU nature of the injunction?]
Merpel notes para.42 of the ruling:

"The unitary character of the Community trade mark is also apparent from the fifteenth and sixteenth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 40/94. These state, first, that the effects of decisions regarding the validity and infringement of Community trade marks must cover the entire area of the European Union, in order to prevent inconsistent decisions on the part of the courts and OHIM and to ensure that the unitary character of Community trade marks is not undermined, and, second, that contradictory judgments should be avoided in actions which involve the same acts and the same parties and which are brought on the basis of a Community trade mark and parallel national trade marks. ".
This would appear to suggest that the court did not intend anything it said about the unitary character of the Community trade mark to point to its likely position on "genuine use" of a Community trade mark in only part of the EU.

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Global dispute with only local significance

"Where there's life ... there's Bud" --
but who, or what, is Bud in Europe?
Every few weeks there seems to be another giant-sized decision in the Battle of the Buds -- and here's the next installment: Case C 96/09 P Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Budějovický Budvar, a ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), delivered dew-fresh and delicious all the way from Luxembourg.

In this particular version of the battle of the two breweries for the heart and soul of Budweiser beer, Anheuser-Busch applied to register four Community trade marks (CTMs). The first was a figurative mark featuring the word Bud for goods in Classes 16, 21, 25 and 32. The other three applications were in respect of the word mark Bud, in Classes 32 (beers), 33 (alcoholic beverages), 35 (setting up databases, gathering data and information in databases), 38 (telecommunications, ie making available and supplying data and information, supplying and communicating information stored in databases), 41 (education, entertainment) and 42 (restaurant, bar and pub services; operating a database).

Budvar opposed, citing the following alleged prior rights: (i) a figurative Bud mark effective for ‘all types of light and dark beer’, in Austria, Benelux and Italy; (ii) the appellation of origin ‘Bud’, registered under the Lisbon Agreement in respect of beer, and effective in France, Italy and Portugal; (iii) an Austrian appellation of origin ‘Bud’ protected in Austria under a bilateral convention with the former state of Czechoslovakia.
The Opposition Division partially upheld Budvar’s opposition, in respect of ‘restaurant, bar and pub services’ covered by Anheuser-Busch’s fourth application. All other grounds of opposition were dismissed. The Opposition Division considered that Budvar had proved that it had a right to the appellation of origin ‘Bud’ in France, Italy and Portugal, though in relation to Italy and Portugal the arguments put forward by Budvar were not sufficiently specific to determine the scope of its protection under national law. It found that the ‘restaurant, bar and pub services’ covered by one of the applications were similar to the ‘beer’ covered by the appellation of origin ‘Bud’, there being a likelihood of confusion given that the signs concerned were identical. However, in respect of the other goods, and in the context of the applicable French law, Budvar had failed to demonstrate how the use of the mark applied for was likely to weaken or undermine the reputation of the appellation of origin concerned, when the goods covered were different.

Both parties appealed. The Board of Appeal dismissed all Budvar’s appeals but allowed that of Anheuser-Busch. It considered that Budvar no longer appeared to refer to its international figurative mark as the basis of its opposition, but solely to the appellation of origin ‘Bud’. It was however difficult to see how ‘Bud’ could be considered to be an appellation (or designation) of origin, or even an indirect indication of geographical origin. The Board also held that the evidence provided by Budvar to show use of the appellation of origin ‘Bud’ in Austria, France, Italy and Portugal was insufficient. Thirdly, it held that Budvar had not demonstrated that the appellation of origin gave it the right to prohibit use of the word ‘Bud’ as a trade mark in Austria or France.
Budvar appealed to the Court of First Instance (now the General Court), contending that (i) the sign BUD could be considered to be an appellation of origin, and (ii) the conditions of Article 8(4) of Regulation 40/94, in relation to an opposition based on the existence of an earlier non-registered mark of more than purely local significance, were satisfied. The Court of First Instance allowed the appeal.

In reaching its decision the Court of First Instance found that ‘Bud’ could be considered to be an appellation of origin and that it was protected under the Lisbon Agreement, and that the validity of a national mark may not be called into question in proceedings for registration of a CTM: when the contested decisions were adopted, the effects of the appellation of origin ‘Bud’ had not been declared invalid in France by a decision against which there was no appeal. Accordingly the Board of Appeal did not have the power to call into question the fact that the claimed earlier right was an appellation of origin. At most it could have suspended the opposition proceedings until a final judgment on the matter was delivered. The Court also found that the appellation ‘Bud’ remained protected under the bilateral convention, was still effective following the break-up of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The Court then upheld Budvar’s appeal in relation to the use in the course of trade of a sign of more than mere local significance. The Board of Appeal was wrong in law to apply, by analogy, the provisions of Community law relating to the ‘genuine’ use of an earlier trade mark. In the present context, an opposing party need only show that a sign had been used in the context of a commercial activity with a view to economic advantage. Subject to this, an appellation of origin registered under the Lisbon Agreement could not be deemed to have become generic. In any event, such appellations might enjoy protection in a particular territory even though they are only used in another territory.

On the facts, the Court held, Budvar had provided proof that the signs concerned were used in the course of trade and it was unnecessary to show that the signs were used prior to the contested CTM applications. At most, Budvar only had to show that the signs were used before publication of the trade mark applications in the Community Trade Marks Bulletin. The documents Budvar relied on were sufficient proof of use of the word ‘Bud’ even though they referred to a product on which the word ‘Bud’ was always accompanied by ‘strong’ or ‘super strong’.

In the context of an opposition based on the use in the course of trade of a sign of more than mere local significance, the Court held that it was sufficient for the sign to be used in the course of trade: the fact that it was identical to a trade mark did not mean that it was not used in the course of trade. Moreover, OHIM and Anheuser-Busch did not clearly specify how the sign ‘Bud’ had been used ‘as a trade mark’. There was no evidence that the expression ‘Bud’, displayed on the goods in question, referred to the commercial origin of the products more than to its geographical origin.

The word ‘significance’ in the formula “more than mere local significance” referred to the geographical extent of a sign’s protection: the Board of Appeal therefore erred in law when, as regards France, it linked proof of use of the sign concerned to the requirement that the right concerned must have a significance which is not merely local.

The Court then reviewed the effect and significance of litigation between the same parties and concerning the same sign in various national jurisdictions. The Court considered that those decisions were not binding upon it and that It was not conclusive that Budvar had not been able to prevent Anheuser-Busch’s distributor from selling beer in France under the Bud trade mark since, under Article 8(4), the opposing party does not need to establish that he has in fact already been able to prohibit use of a subsequent mark, but only that he has such a right available to him.

Anheuser-Busch then appealed to the ECJ.  Advocate General Cruz Villalón advised the ECJ to allow the appeal and remit the case to the General Court. Why? In particular he considered that (i) the requirement of ‘use in the course of trade’ in Article 8(4) is, like the other requirements in that provision, an independent concept which warrants its own interpretation; (ii) it is relevant to argue that an opponent relying on Article 8(4) has used the invoked sign as a trade mark rather than for the purpose of indicating the geographical origin of a product; (iii) for the purposes of Article 8(4) the use of the opponent’s sign must, where appropriate, be proved before the date of filing, rather than at any time up to the date of publication, of the opposed application for registration (iv) the judgment under appeal supplied an interpretation which was excessively literal and which adhered too closely to the wording of Article 8(4).

This morning the Court of Justice accepted the advice of the Advocate General, set aside the judgment of the (now) General Court which, it said, made three errors of law, and remitted the case for further consideration by that Court. The judgment has only just been posted on the Curia website and, at 221 paragraphs, will take some time to read, but the non-binding press release says:
" ... the General Court was incorrect in holding that it was sufficient, for the purpose of establishing that the sign ‘bud’ was of more than mere local significance, that the sign was protected in a number of States. The Court of Justice notes, in that regard, that, even if the geographical extent of the protection of the sign concerned is more than local, registration of a Community trade mark may be prevented only when the sign is actually used in a sufficiently significant manner in the course of trade in a substantial part of the territory in which it is protected. Use in the course of trade must also be assessed separately for each of the territories in which the sign is protected. 
Next, ... the General Court also made an error in holding that the Regulation did not require the sign ‘bud’ to have been used in the territory in which it is protected and that use in a territory other than the territory of protection may be sufficient to prevent registration of a new trade mark, even where there is no use at all in the territory of protection. In that connection, ...it is only in the territory in which the sign protected, in its entirety or in a part of it, that the exclusive rights attached to the sign may enter into conflict with a Community trade mark.
Finally, ... in holding that it had to be shown only that the sign concerned was used in the course of trade before publication of the trade mark application and not, at the latest, as at the date of the application, the General Court made a further error of law. In view, in particular, of the considerable period of time which may elapse between the filing of an application and its publication, applying the test relating to the date of the application provides a better guarantee that the use claimed for the sign concerned is real and not an exercise whose sole aim has been to prevent registration of a new trade mark. Furthermore, as a general rule, where the sign concerned is used exclusively or to a large extent during the period between filing of the application for a Community trade mark and publication of the application, that will not be sufficient to establish that the use of the sign in the course of trade has been such as to prove that the sign is of sufficient significance. 
The Court of Justice, while rejecting the other grounds of appeal raised by Anheuser-Busch, sets aside in part the judgment of the General Court in so far as the judgment makes the three errors of law thus found. Since the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given by the Court of Justice, the latter refers the case back to the General Court to give judgment afresh".
The IPKat was rather expecting this.  Though he has a tendency to prefer the sort of literalism that the General Court employed, he believes that the ECJ's ruling is more in line with the legislative intent than was that of the inferior court.  Merpel adds, the first of Anheuser-Busch's four applications was filed on 1 April 1996.  It's almost 15 years to the day later, and we still have the prospect of a rehearing by the General Court which itself is subject to a possible -- and in the case of these two parties highly likely -- further appeal to the ECJ.  Is there truly no better path to Community trade mark registration?