Showing posts with label Bundesgerichtshof. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bundesgerichtshof. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
BGH decides in eis.de/Bananabay "AdWords" case
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Thursday, June 23, 2011
Bundesgerichtshof on the "lawfulness of a press report"
The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) this week had to decide on the lawfulness of a press report about a book presentation by former news reader, journalist and author Eva Herrman (shown to the left), in particular whether this report was an infringement of Ms Herrman’s general personality right under the German constitution (case reference VI ZR 262/09 of 21 June 2011).Eva Herrmann used to present the main news show Tagesschau on German television and is a somewhat controversial person with decisive views on various topics. While presenting her book “The Noah’s arc principle - why we have to save the family” (Das Prinzip Arche Noah - warum wir die Familie retten müssen) to journalists in 2007, Ms Herrman elaborated that traditional family values were again needed today, such as those that supported a higher regard for the role of the mother. Unfortunately, these family values had been abolished with the German student movement of 1968. She also referred to the Nazi time and said while most things had been dreadful during and Adolf Hitler had been a “totally crazy and highly dangerous politician”, the regard for families had been one of the very few good things during that time.
For those who are interested in what exactly Ms Herrman had to say, the Bundesgerichtshof’s press release includes a transcript of Ms Herrman’s actual comments as well as the wording of the press report (see here , in German).
The press report in dispute summarised Ms. Herrman’s various musings albeit in an ironic way, inter alia, referring to the fact that she was already married for the fourth time. The report also mentioned her comments on the Third Reich and ended with the words, that "thankfully" the book launch presentation ended after her comments on this topic. Ms Herrman objected to the report. She felt that its tone wrongly alluded that she was a supporter of the Nazi ideology. She further argued that the she was incorrectly quoted, which amounted to an infringement of her general personality right as protected under Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the German constitution.
The lower courts, the Regional and Higher Regional Courts of Cologne, agreed with Ms. Herrman. The Bundesgerichtshof however agreed with the view of the defendants who had argued that Ms Herrman’s general personality right had not been infringed. In its press release of 21 June 2011 the Bundesgerichtshof clarified that the general personality right not only provides protection against being wrongly quoted (Fehlzitat), but also protects against other incorrect or falsified or distorted representations of statements. More particularly, the court stressed that the general personality right included the right to “one’s own word” and protected the individual from having statements attributed to them which have not made and which may compromise their self-defined claim to social respect (“selbst definierter sozialer Geltungsanspruch”). Upon a review of the press report in question, the court then found that Ms Herrman’s comments and theses had been correctly reflected as regards to the “choice of words, context, the thought process and general purport (Stoßrichtung)”.
The Bundesgerichtshof's press release can be found here (in German).
Merpel thinks that the court got it right and is pleased with this victory for free speech. This Kat however has some sympathy for Ms Herrman. Noone wants to be seen as having views that even remotely resemble those of the Nazi ideology and this Kat can understand why she took the matter to the courts to set the record straight.
Labels:
Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany,
Personality rights,
privacy rights
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Smell-alike perfumes - the Bundesgerichtshof's view
On 5 May 2011, the First Civil Senate of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) which is, inter alia, responsible for competition law matters decided that trading with smell-alike perfumes, that are imitations of perfume products that are bearing a protected trade mark does not qualify as unlawful (unlauter) comparative advertising in the sense of Article 6 (2) No. 6 German Unfair Competition Act (UWG) if there is no clear and obvious imitation of the original perfume but where the smell-alike perfume merely evokes an allusion of the original products (case reference: I ZR 157/09 - Creation Lamis).By way of background: Article 6 UWG is based on Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising, in particular its Article 2 (c) and its Article 4.
The facts: the defendants were offering low priced perfumes on the Internet under the mark "Creation Lamis". These low priced perfumes had similar smells to those of expensive perfume brands. The defendants initially also used ‘comparison charts’ which compared the defendants' smell-alike perfumes with the respective high priced original perfume brand. The defendants had, however, ceased using the comparison charts in recent years.
The claimant, who is a distributor of high priced luxury perfumes brands, took objection to this in its view unfair business practice. The claimant argued that the defendants’ offering, advertising and distribution of the smell-alike perfumes amounted to unfair competition since the smell-alikes were recognisable as imitations of the claimant's high priced original perfume brands all of which where registered as trade marks. The claimant had been unsuccessful in the lower instance courts insofar as it had tried to prevent the defendants' trade with the smell-alikes without the use of comparison charts. In this regard the Bundesgerichtshof allowed the claimant's appeal and sent the case back to the court of appeal, the Kammergericht Berlin.
The Bundesgerichtshof explained that Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG does not prohibit to imitate an original product. Furthermore, it will not amount to unfair comparative advertising in the sense of Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG where the original product is recognisable due to the get-up and labelling of the respective imitation (here the smell-alike) even if its advertising evokes certain allusions. What is prohibited under Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG is a clear and definite imitation statement (Imitationsbehauptung) which makes it clear by itself - and without the need to consider any additional circumstances - that the advertised product is advertised as a copy of a certain and specific original product.
The court of appeal had assessed the question as to whether there was a clear and obvious imitation statement by looking at the end user's perspective and decided that there was no imitiation in the sense of Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG in this case. The Bundesgerichtshof confirmed that the court of appeal had determined the facts correctly with regard to the end-user perspective.
However, the Bundesgerichtshof found that the court of appeal's decision had not discussed the claimant's argument that the defendant had also targeted retailers with its smell-alike perfumes and not only end users. The claimants had argued that retailers, who had a more specialised knowledge, would have recognised the defendants' smell-alike perfumes as clear imitations of the original luxury perfumes due their 'get-up' (Ausstattung) and their allusive names. In this regard the Bundesgerichts stressed that where an advertisement was targeting different groups of consumers, it was enough to render such an advertisement "unfair" if the conditions of Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG where met for only one group of the consumers targeted (here: the retailers). As such, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to overturn the court of appeal's decision and send the case back to the court of appeal. The Bundesgerichtshof also held the court of appeal should examine whether the defendants' advertising towards retailers amounted to an exploitation of the reputation of the claimant's trade marks.
While some German observers have already stated that the court has made it easier to trade with smell-alike perfumes due to the relatively high threshold for the application of Article 6 (2) No. 6 UWG, it should be kept in mind that the court of appeal might find that retailers would easily recognise the smell-alikes as imitations of one particular perfume. This Kat will be interested to read the Bundesgerichtshof's decision in its entirety once it becomes available, as well as the Kammergericht Berlin's actual decision in this particular case. Perfumes clearly make for interesting trade mark cases.
The court's press release can be retrieved by clicking here (in German)
Perfume for cats - here.
Sunday, May 8, 2011
BGH on the use of a well-known car maker’s trade mark in advertisements for a garage business
The German Federal Supreme Court’s (Bundesgerichsthof, “BGH") First Civil Senate on 14 April 2011 (case reference: I ZR 33/10) had to decide on a case concerning the use of a well-known car maker’s device mark in advertisements for an independent garage business. The facts of this case are reminiscent of the facts in the ECJ’s famous BMW/Deenik decision of 1999 (case-63/97). Please find this Kat's translation and summary of the BGH’s press release of 19 April 2011 below.
The claimant, the well-known German manufacturer Volkswagen AG („VW“), is the proprietor of a device trade mark which depicts the VW logo in a circle and which covers, inter alia, “cars” and “car repair and maintenance”. The defendant, ATU Auto-Teile-Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG (“ATU”), owns several hundred independent (as in: unrelated to a specific car brand) garages.
VW took objection to the defendant’s use of the VW device mark in ATU’s advertisements for ATU’s maintenance and repair services in relation VW motor cars. The first instance court, the Regional court of Hamburg (LG Hamburg, decision of 21 February 2008, case reference: 315 O 768/07) and on appeal the Higher Regional court of Hamburg (OLG Hamburg, decision of 16. December 2009, case reference: 5 U 47/08) both decided in VW’s favour.
The BGH confirmed the lower courts' decisions on ATU’s further appeal. The BGH took the view that ATU’s use was infringing use of the claimant’s registered device trade mark. In its advertisements for repair works of VW cars, the defendant had used a device trade mark that was identical to the claimant’s device mark for identical services. By doing so the defendant had infringed the claimant’s trade mark since the use of the well-known logo resulted in an image transfer which weakened VW’s trade mark.
Are you now wondering 'but what about the ECJ’s guidance in BMW/Deenik?', since the ECJ appeared to have taken a perhaps more liberal view back in 1999? While BMW/Deenik is not expressly mentioned in the BGH’s press release, the VW/ATU decision is clearly an interpretation of the former and this Kat hence holds any bet that BMW/Deenik is discussed in much detail in the grounds of VW/ATU which are yet unavailable. In the meantime, however, the BGH’s press release tells us the following: while trade mark law provides that a trade mark proprietor cannot prohibit a third party from using the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a service provided the third party uses the trade mark in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. The BGH decided that in this particular case these requirements were not met in the case of ATU’s use of the VW logo since ATU could have just as well (“ohne weiteres”) used the claimant’s word marks “VW” or “Volkswagen” to describe its services and was not dependant on the to use the device mark.
Merpel now muses whether this decision implies that the advertising function of a device mark could be more worthy of protection than the advertising function of a mere word mark? Also, what would happen if the claimant had only owned a device mark without a word element or vice versa? The answers to these (and other) questions will (hopefully) be in the grounds of the decision and this Kat is very keen to see the BGH’s interpretation of “where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service”, (see also Article 6 TM Directive). For the purposes of informing consumers in an advertisement, use of the word mark itself will in most cases suffice and it will not be “necessary” to use the device mark. Most notably the BGH’s press release states that “in this particular case” use of the device mark was not necessary. It does not state that use of a device mark in advertisement can never be necessary. Some German observers have already criticised that this decision appears to favour brand-associated/authorised garages over independent garages. We will be able to judge once the full decision is out...
The court’s press release of 19 April 2011 can be retrieved by clicking here.
The claimant, the well-known German manufacturer Volkswagen AG („VW“), is the proprietor of a device trade mark which depicts the VW logo in a circle and which covers, inter alia, “cars” and “car repair and maintenance”. The defendant, ATU Auto-Teile-Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG (“ATU”), owns several hundred independent (as in: unrelated to a specific car brand) garages.VW took objection to the defendant’s use of the VW device mark in ATU’s advertisements for ATU’s maintenance and repair services in relation VW motor cars. The first instance court, the Regional court of Hamburg (LG Hamburg, decision of 21 February 2008, case reference: 315 O 768/07) and on appeal the Higher Regional court of Hamburg (OLG Hamburg, decision of 16. December 2009, case reference: 5 U 47/08) both decided in VW’s favour.
The BGH confirmed the lower courts' decisions on ATU’s further appeal. The BGH took the view that ATU’s use was infringing use of the claimant’s registered device trade mark. In its advertisements for repair works of VW cars, the defendant had used a device trade mark that was identical to the claimant’s device mark for identical services. By doing so the defendant had infringed the claimant’s trade mark since the use of the well-known logo resulted in an image transfer which weakened VW’s trade mark. Are you now wondering 'but what about the ECJ’s guidance in BMW/Deenik?', since the ECJ appeared to have taken a perhaps more liberal view back in 1999? While BMW/Deenik is not expressly mentioned in the BGH’s press release, the VW/ATU decision is clearly an interpretation of the former and this Kat hence holds any bet that BMW/Deenik is discussed in much detail in the grounds of VW/ATU which are yet unavailable. In the meantime, however, the BGH’s press release tells us the following: while trade mark law provides that a trade mark proprietor cannot prohibit a third party from using the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a service provided the third party uses the trade mark in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. The BGH decided that in this particular case these requirements were not met in the case of ATU’s use of the VW logo since ATU could have just as well (“ohne weiteres”) used the claimant’s word marks “VW” or “Volkswagen” to describe its services and was not dependant on the to use the device mark.
Merpel now muses whether this decision implies that the advertising function of a device mark could be more worthy of protection than the advertising function of a mere word mark? Also, what would happen if the claimant had only owned a device mark without a word element or vice versa? The answers to these (and other) questions will (hopefully) be in the grounds of the decision and this Kat is very keen to see the BGH’s interpretation of “where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service”, (see also Article 6 TM Directive). For the purposes of informing consumers in an advertisement, use of the word mark itself will in most cases suffice and it will not be “necessary” to use the device mark. Most notably the BGH’s press release states that “in this particular case” use of the device mark was not necessary. It does not state that use of a device mark in advertisement can never be necessary. Some German observers have already criticised that this decision appears to favour brand-associated/authorised garages over independent garages. We will be able to judge once the full decision is out...
The court’s press release of 19 April 2011 can be retrieved by clicking here.
Labels:
BMW,
Bundesgerichtshof,
Car marks,
Deenik,
German trade marks,
vw
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
BGH: hyperlinks, freedom of expression and copyright infringing software
Already decided on 14 October 2010, even though only published in its entirety now, has been a decision (case reference: I ZR 191/08; 'AnyDVD') by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) concerning a lawsuit brought by several music companies against Heise Verlag, an online publisher specializing in IT and computer news. The claimaint's took objection to reports published on Heise’s website which included links to a third party website (SlySoft) that offered software that allowed circumventing copy protection for DVDs.While the lower courts, the Regional and Higher Courts of Munich I, had held that Heise's online reports were itself copyright infringing, the First Civil Senate of the Bundesgerichtshof took the view that adding the links on Heise's website which linked to SlySoft's website (where SlySoft offered copyright right infringing software) was covered by the constitutional right of freedom of press and freedom of opinion under Article 5(1) German Constitution (Grundgesetz). Further, in cases where the actual text of a report was protected by freedom of expression and freedom of press, the included links would also be afforded equal protection. The judges stressed that the purpose of the links on Heise's website was not only to technically facilitate to access the SlySoft's website but the links were to be regarded as part of Heise's reporting because they were complementing and 'backing up' what was reported with additional information. The fact that the Heise was aware that the software offered on SlySoft's website was copyright infringing did not change this and so could not be blamed on Heise since the information interest of the general public was of higher importance.
The judges also argued that reports on illegal conduct (here: that SlySoft offering copyright infringing software) could be of particular public information interest. It was also important that Heise had clearly indicated in its report that SlySoft's software was copyright infringing. In this context the Bundesgerichtshof explained that protection of Article 5(1) Grundgesetz encompassed freedom of expression and freedom of media in all its aspects and was thus not limited to the content of the report, but it also included the (outer) form of this reporting. As such, it was up to Heise itself, as the subject entitled to the fundamental right under Article 5(1) Grundgesetz, to decide which form of presentation it chose for its reporting. This also encompassed the decision whether additional information about a company and its products (here: SlySoft) should be expressly used in the report and it could include the decision to publish links to SlySoft's website.
The court, inter alia, based its decision on Article 95 a German Copyright Act which is based on Article 6 of the Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) (“Obligations as to technological measures”). Intriguingly, the Bundesgerichtshof interpreted Article 95 a German Copyright Act not only in the light of Article 5(1) Grundgesetz but also in light of Article 11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which stipulates as follows “(e)veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” Article 11 (2) provides that “(t)he freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.” Referring to the ECJ's precedent in Connolly/Commission (C-274/99 P), the Bundesgerichtshof also stressed that content and quality of a report are irrelevant when it comes to the application of Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
This interesting decision can be retrieved from the Bundesgerichtshof's website here (in German).
Sunday, April 10, 2011
ICE, ICE.... - the BGH and the citation of a design
Those of our readers that have been travelling by train in Germany may be familiar with the Intercity-Express or ICE high speed trains. The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) last week had to decide on a design right case relating to the depiction of an ICE type 3 (see left) train in a marketing brochure. On 7 April 2011 the Bundesgerichtshof held that depictions of designs are not permissible under § 40 (3) of the German Design Act (GeschMG) if they are merely used for advertising purposes (case reference I ZR 56/09). The claimant, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, had been seeking a declaratory judgement that German railway company Deutsche Bahn AG had no claims against it for having used photographs of ICE trains in an advertising brochure published by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft. The relevant provision in the German Design Act § 40 (3) of the German Design Act (GeschMG) relating to the right of citation provides as follows: the rights conferred by a design right can not be exercised in respect of acts of reproduction for the purposes of making citations or for teaching, provided that such acts are compatible with fair trade practice and do not unduly prejudice the normal exploitation of the design, and that the source is mentioned. By way of background: § 40 (3) GeschMG is shaped according to Article 13 (1)(c) of the Design Directive 98/71/EC and an equivalent provision can also be found in Article 20 (1) (c) of the Design Regulation (EC) 6/2002 as regards to Community Designs.The Bundesgerichtshof took the view that § 40 (3) GeschMG required that there was a connection between the depicted design and the operations of Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft and that the photographs of the ICE trains that were used in the brochure had served as a quotation for statements made by Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft. Pure marketing however did not meet the requirements of a citation in the sense of § 40 (3) GeschMG. The information provided by the claimant in its brochure referred to the ICE train type 1 but a photograph of an ICE train type 3 was used. Consequently, the Bundesgerichtshof found that the depiction of the ICE train type 3 had only served marketing purposes and could not be seen as a permissible citation that served to illustrate the operations of the claimant.
The court’s press release relating to this case can be found here (in German). The moral of this story according to Merpel is rather more simplistic: use a photo of ICE type 1 when you are writing about ICE type 1. Use a photo of ICE type 3 when writing about ICE type 3, otherwise, do not try to invoke § 40 (3) GeschMG.
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
German Federal Patent Court decides in Neuschwanstein castle trade mark dispute
News in the trade mark dispute surrounding the German castle Neuschwanstein (see the IPKat's report here) .By way of reminder: the Bavarian Castle Department (which is part of the Bavarian state government)has the task of regulating the souvenir trade connected to the famous Bavarian fairy tale castle and its surrounding area and registered the word mark "Neuschwanstein" in 2005. The German Federal Association Bundesverband Souvenir Geschenke Ehrenpreise e.V. (BSGE) - which describes itself as "a network of producers, wholesalers, exporters, retailers and trade representatives from the souvenir, sports clubs, trophy and festive items (industry)" - objected to this. Arguing that the Bavarian Castle Department's trade mark registration was akin to "censorship" of the Neuschwanstein souvenir trade, the BSGE filed for an invalidity of this mark at the DPMA. The DPMA (see IPKat report here) decided in the BSGE's favour and invalidated the mark, according to media reports, the DPMA found that "Neuschwanstein" was an "often used", non-distinctive term" and thus not capable to indicate trade origin of the goods and services marketed under the sign.
The German Federal Patent Court has now decided this matter and issued a press release confirming that it has upheld the DPMA's decision to cancel the "Neuschwanstein" trade mark. In its press release of 8 February 2011 concerning "Neuschwanstein" (case reference 25 W (pat) 182/09 of 4 February 2011) the court has provided the following information which this Kat has translated and summarised below.
The sign "Neuschwanstein“had been registered as a trade mark in 2005 for a multitude of goods and services. On 20 November 2007 the German Patent and Trademark Office decided on an invalidity application concerning this mark holding that the mark should be invalidated because it fell foul of § 8 (2) No. 1 German Trademarks Act (MarkenG) since it had lacked distinctiveness at the time of registration and still lacked distinctiveness now.
Upon appeal, the 25th Senate of the German Federal Patent Court upheld this decision and, inter alia, decided that the term "Neuschwanstein" described the castle Neuschwanstein which was commissioned by Kind Ludwig II in the municipality of Schwangau in the state of Bavaria with the castle being a world famous landmark of high (cultural-)historical importance.
As regards to services such as "travel services; catering/hospitality services and accommodation services", the term "Neuschwanstein" does not qualify for trade mark registration since the term could be seen as describing the characteristics of the services in the sense of § 8 (2) No. 2 MarkenG, that is their intended purpose or the geographical origin of rendering the services.
Designations of well-known tourist attractions such as "Neuschwanstein" furthermore lack the necessary distinctiveness under § 8 (2) No. 1 MarkenG concerning such goods that are usually offered in the proximity of such tourist destinations as souvenir articles or to satisfy the demands of tourist with regard to foods, drinks or further articles. This equally applies to services that are usually rendered and offered in a close proximity or in the context of such tourist attractions.
The court stressed that the term "Neuschwanstein" not only described a tourist sight but also a building that is a significant part of the national cultural heritage. The judges further held that designations of cultural sights that are of high i
mportance and/or that are part of the national or international world cultural heritage are common property and as such cannot be monopolised or commercialised through trade mark laws. The court added that these sights usually are not distinctive enough for trade mark registration in the sense of § 8 (2) No. 1 MarkenG, even without a factual reference to claimed goods and services
The German Federal Patent Court has now decided this matter and issued a press release confirming that it has upheld the DPMA's decision to cancel the "Neuschwanstein" trade mark. In its press release of 8 February 2011 concerning "Neuschwanstein" (case reference 25 W (pat) 182/09 of 4 February 2011) the court has provided the following information which this Kat has translated and summarised below.
The sign "Neuschwanstein“had been registered as a trade mark in 2005 for a multitude of goods and services. On 20 November 2007 the German Patent and Trademark Office decided on an invalidity application concerning this mark holding that the mark should be invalidated because it fell foul of § 8 (2) No. 1 German Trademarks Act (MarkenG) since it had lacked distinctiveness at the time of registration and still lacked distinctiveness now.
Upon appeal, the 25th Senate of the German Federal Patent Court upheld this decision and, inter alia, decided that the term "Neuschwanstein" described the castle Neuschwanstein which was commissioned by Kind Ludwig II in the municipality of Schwangau in the state of Bavaria with the castle being a world famous landmark of high (cultural-)historical importance.
As regards to services such as "travel services; catering/hospitality services and accommodation services", the term "Neuschwanstein" does not qualify for trade mark registration since the term could be seen as describing the characteristics of the services in the sense of § 8 (2) No. 2 MarkenG, that is their intended purpose or the geographical origin of rendering the services.
Designations of well-known tourist attractions such as "Neuschwanstein" furthermore lack the necessary distinctiveness under § 8 (2) No. 1 MarkenG concerning such goods that are usually offered in the proximity of such tourist destinations as souvenir articles or to satisfy the demands of tourist with regard to foods, drinks or further articles. This equally applies to services that are usually rendered and offered in a close proximity or in the context of such tourist attractions.
The court stressed that the term "Neuschwanstein" not only described a tourist sight but also a building that is a significant part of the national cultural heritage. The judges further held that designations of cultural sights that are of high i
Given that several aspects of this decision have fundamental importance, the Federal Patent Court allowed a further (partial) appeal to the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof). On balance, this Kat believes that the court got it right but cannot help but thinking that the general idea of wanting to control the souvenir output surrounding the Neuschwanstein castle is not a bad one. How about having some kind of licensing committee when it comes to merchandise of such historical sights. Merpel, who likes her newly bought Neuschwanstein t-shirt (left), disagrees and thinks that this German Kat is nothing but a snob.... why not let the tourists decide what the want to spend their money on, rather than the Bavarian state?
Case reference : Bundespatentgericht, 25 W (pat) 182/09, delivered on 4 February 2011.
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